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A. Introduction
"The one great advantage of the common law is that, where it falls into trouble, it is never
more than one great case away from pulling itself together."1
A bank overlooks its customer's "stop-payment" instruction and mistakenly
honours the earlier payment instruction. The payment instruction relates to a
valid debt owed by the customer, but the customer has decided not to pay the
debt for the moment. Having paid out without authority, the bank cannot, it
seems, debit the customer's account. So it sues the payee to recover the money -
and, according to the well-known case of Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms, Son &
Cooke (Southern) Ltd2 ("Barclays Bank"), the bank succeeds. The payee's good
faith receipt of the payment does not provide it with a defence; rather the payee
must rely on general restitutionary defences, in particular that of change of
position.
The reasoning in Barclays Bank attractively explains why mistaken payments
are primafacie recoverable. And, if the bank's payment is seen as a simple example
of a mistaken payment, the result seems right. To the extent that the payee has
not changed its position it does appear to have been enriched as a result of the
bank's mistake. But is the payment in this situation a simple example of a
mistaken payment? I suggest that it is a more complex situation requiring the
recognition of a new defence arising from the reasonable reliance which in these
circumstances a payee places (and should be entitled to place) on the fact of
payment by a bank.
A factor distinguishing the bank's mistake from the typical example of a
mistaken payment is that in the typical case no money is due to anyone. In
contrast, in the stop-payment example, a debt is due to the payee. So, from the
payee's perspective, there is a good legal cause3 for retaining the money.
Moreover payment has come from the debtor's agent. The bank, the customer
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Peter Birks, "Recovering Value Transferred Under an Illegal Contract", (2000) 1
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 155,158. A-G v Blake [2001] 4 AC 268, 292 (HL) and
Kleinworth Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349, 377 (HL) ("Kleinworth Benson")
contain observations stressing the evolution of the law so as to provide "practical
justice".
2 [1980] QB 677 (QB).
3 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) ("Unjust
Enrichment"), 129-130.
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and the payee all work within a web of commercial relationships. The payee has
a reasonable expectation that the payment will not be disturbed just because of
a mistake which the bank makes in its own mind.
So, at least two significant public policy considerations - agency and finality
of payment - support denying recovery to the bank. They suggest that the
circumstances surrounding the (mistaken) payment warrant the courts treating
the payee differently from other recipients of mistaken payments. It is suggested
that the courts should recognise that the payee has a "good consideration"
defence on the ground that he or she gave consideration for the receipt (by
accepting the money in satisfaction of the debt owed by the customer). I call this
the "reasonable expectation" approach.
The issue is topical, and recently Dr Schall has offered a different explanation
of the "good consideration" defence and how it applies in this context.4 He
justifies the result in Barclays Bank on the ground that there was no agreement
(giving rise to consideration) between the bank and the payee. Dr Schall regards
the contract between the customer and the payee as being insufficient to affect
the bank. The implication is that the "good consideration" defence protects the
contractual relationship between the two immediate parties to the contract, and
has no wider ambit than that.5 I advance a much wider view of the "good
consideration" defence. In so doing I re-appraise the approach in Barclays Bank.
Barclays Bank is not just another case. It heralded a number of "fundamental
changes"6 in our law, and its reasoning has received general acceptance from
both the judiciary7 and academics,8 albeit not universal acceptance.9 Part B
provides a brief reminder of why Barclays Bank receives such a favourable
reception.
In Part C I make my case for the "reasonable expectation" approach. I show
why agency considerations and the need for finality in payment mechanisms
justify the recognition of a new defence. I am not suggesting that the "reasonable
expectation" approach applies whenever the bank overlooks a stop-payment
instruction. In at least three situations considerations favouring recovery
outweigh those of agency and finality of payment. The first situation is when,
prior to receipt of the payment, the payee becomes aware of the stop-payment
instruction. In this situation the payee is not misled by the fact of payment. The
second situation is when the payee is a volunteer. Here, to state the obvious, the
payee gives no consideration for the payment. The third (and last) situation is
A Schall, "Three-Party Situations in Unjust Enrichment Epitomised by Mistaken
Bank Transfers" [2004] RLR 110 ("Schall").
5 ibid, 113-116.
6 Kleinworth Benson [1999] 2 AC 349, 373 (HL), per Lord Goff.
7 Lloyds Bank plc v Independent Insurance Co Ltd [2000] QB 110 (CA).
8 GJones (ed), Goffand Jones, The Law of Restitution, 6th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, London,
2002) ("Goff & Jones"), paras 4-037 to 4-039.
Westpac v Rae [1992] 1 NZLR 338, 346 (HC). See also Unjust Enrichment, above
note 3, 97. Professor Birks questions the lack of protection English law currently
provides for the payee who in good faith regards the payment as paying the debt
and suggests that this is one area where the law should prefer the "reality to the
technicality", ibid, 77.
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when the payment instruction was never valid, ie it was a forgery. In this situation
the courts appear to regard the complete absence of mandate as a crucial factor
which, when considering the respective positions of the bank and the payee,
outweighs the payee's reasonable reliance upon the payment.10
The "reasonable expectation" approach is a departure from our current
understanding of the law as it is expressed in Barclays Bank. For this reason it is
insufficient merely to provide the positive case for adopting the "reasonable
expectation" approach. I go further to analyse critically a number of assumptions
underlying the reasoning in Barclays Bank. This occurs in Part D. In essence I
suggest that the Court in Barclays Bank erred in applying the general principles
it had developed without considering the context in which the bank made its
mistake. Building upon suggestions in earlier academic writing," but admittedly
contrary to the trend of current opinion, I suggest that in Barclays Bank the Court
developed inappropriately an either-or approach to this situation, ie, either unjust
enrichment principles apply or contractual principles apply. This has the effect
of overlooking agency principles and downplaying the need for commercial
certainty in payment mechanisms. This is significant for both factors contribute
to the payee's expectation of finality, make that expectation a reasonable one to
hold, and justify a departure from the general rule of recovery for mistaken
payments.
B. The Attraction of Barclays Bank
1. Its attraction for lawyers
Barclays Bank is a landmark case. In it Goff J. identified some core principles,
showed how they could rationalise the existing law, and indicated how they
could provide a foundation for the law's principled development. Mistaken
payment cases, such as Kelly v Solari,2 provided (and may still do 13) the paradigm
example of restitutionary relief. Nevertheless, prior to Barclays Bank the case-
law appeared to be fragmented, even inconsistent; the "troublesome" 4 cases
were "notoriously difficult to harmonise." 15 Steve Hedley's observation, that
Barclays Bank discarded "the constrained and irrational set of principles" 16 which
10 See text accompanying n97 - n103.
R Goode, "The Bank's Right to Recover Money Paid on a Stopped Cheque" (1981)
97 LQR 254 (arguing "the payee was entitled to rely on the bank's continued
apparent authority to make payment, so that this was effective to discharge the
drawer's liability to the payee on the cheque" (his emphasis)); R Edwards, "The
Liggett Defence and Apparent Authority" (2001) 31 HKLJ 224, 255-256. But see P
Matthews, "Stopped Cheques and Restitution - Another View" [19821 JBL 281
and Goff & Jones, above note 8, para 4-038, n. 8.
12 (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24 (Ex).
13 Unjust Enrichment, above note 3, 3.
14 Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 504, 513 (CA) per Scrutton LJ.
15 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24; H Luntz, "The Bank's Right to Recover
on Cheques Paid by Mistake" (1968) 6 Melb ULR 308, 321 ("Luntz"), ("[r]easons
for and against allowing recovery vary greatly according to the circumstances ...
and are seldom articulated by judges").
16 S Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001)
("Division and Ordering"), 32.
(2006) Vol 11 No 2
had held sway, articulates the case for its general attraction. Moreover, with
respect to stopped cheques, the results it predicated were consistent with (i)
some dominant cases 7 and emerging restitutionary theory dealing with a third
party's payment of another's debt,18 and (ii) the inter-related question of why
historically successful restitutionary claims arising from the conferral of benefits
in kind, had been rare.19
But Barclays Bank did more than illustrate how the principle of unjust enrichment
could bring coherence to a fragmented area of the law and provide guidance in its
development; it recognised that restitutionary principles require and justify a
change of position defence. 2° This development was more than the recognition of
a new defence; it was the recognition of the definitive restitutionary defence.
As a result of Barclays Bank the law dealing with mistaken payments is now
seductively simple. Subject to some exceptions, 21 the receipt of a payment made
because of a causative mistake22 unjustly enriches the recipient. The law seeks
to return the parties to their former position by imposing an obligation upon the
recipient to repay an equivalent sum. Hardship to innocent recipients is prevented
through the change of position defence.
2. Its attraction for bankers
Bankers too must have found (and continue to find) the result in Barclays Bank
attractive. By recognising a general right of recovery against the payee it heralded
a positive practical change for bankers. Paget's Law of Banking23 provides a
representative illustration of the pre - Barclays Bank understanding of the rights
17 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch D 234 (CA); Re Cleadon Trust Ltd
[1939] Ch 286 (CA).
18 P Birks and J Beatson, "Unrequested Payment of Another's Debt" (1976) 92 LQR
188, 199; reprinted in Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1991). Cf D Friedmann, "Payment of another's debt" (1983) 99 LQR
534; SR Scott, "Mistaken Payment of Another's Debt- Is there an equitable solution?"
[1993] NZ Rec Law Rev 232; and Unjust Enrichment, above note 3,97 (the "emphasis
on discharge may be misplaced"). Other research suggests that the law's response
may differ depending on the circumstances in which the payment is made, see R J
Sutton, "Payment of Debts Charged upon Property", in A S Burrows ed Essays on
the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), 71.
19 P Birks, "Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law" (1971) 24 CLP 110, 114; P Birks,
An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (Paperback ed), (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1989), 109-114. Cf S R Scott, "Restitution and the Argument of Subjective
Devaluation: When is an Enrichment not an Enrichment?" (1993) 14 NZULR 246.
20 Barclays Bank [1980] QB 677, 695.
21 For example, if the payer intended that the payee would have the money in all
events: ibid.
22 While obiter dictum, the causative test has received judicial acceptance: Banque
Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL); Dextra Bank & Trust
Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2001] UKPC 50; [20021 1 All ER (Comm) 193 (PC). Cf
Unjust Enrichment, above note 3, 103 (arguing that the causation test, recovery for
mistaken payment and the unjust factors should be rejected in favour of an 'absence
of basis' approach); and Division and Ordering, above note 16, 32 (causation test
too broad).
M Megrah (ed), Paget's Law of Banking, 7th ed, (Butterworths, London, 1966).
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of bankers in this situation. While noting that the law was "in a somewhat
unsettled and indefinable condition",24 it suggested that a bank's mistaken belief
that it was obliged to its customer to make the payment "was not fundamental
and not such as to sustain a claim for recovery."
25
For bankers the significance of Barclays Bank extends further. Banks prefer to
be seen as mere conduits for transferring their customer's "funds", as opposed
to independent actors with distinct rights and responsibilities. And banks largely
have been successful in encouraging the legislature and courts to view them as
conduits. There are two prominent examples of this. First, there is the statutory
protection conferred on banks that honour a cheque presented to them by a
person who is not the cheque's true owner.26 The second example is the judicial
recognition that a bank can receive a mistaken payment as an agent for its
customer resulting in the application of the "payment over" defence. 27 By
distancing the bank's mistake from the underlying dispute between its customer
and the payee Barclays Bank continues to view banks as a conduit; indeed,
recovery by the bank from the payee is seen as restoring the customer and payee
to their proper positions.2 8
Despite these positive aspects of the reasoning in Barclays Bank there is a
potentially negative aspect for bankers. Its reasoning questions the application
of the so-called "Liggett defence". 29 In essence, this is a defence available to a
bank against its customer who seeks reimbursement for the bank's unauthorised
payment. The defence is based on the premise that the bank's payment has the
effect of paying the customer's legitimate debts. But according to Barclays Bank,
mere payment by the bank is insufficient to discharge the customer's debt; the
customer must also request the payment or ratify the bank's act. The result is to
restrict the application of the "Liggett defence"; some may say remove the defence.
But from a banker's perspective, even before Barclays Bank the "Liggett defence"
was problematic. On purely practical grounds it requires the bank to show that
the proceeds from the mistaken payment are used to pay the customer's
legitimate debts. And on theoretical grounds, since Re Cleadon Trust Ltd' the
scope, if not legitimacy, of the "Liggett defence" is doubtful." So, from a banker's
perspective, the gains arising from the recognition of a direct claim against the
payee probably outweigh the loss of the "Liggett defence".
24 ibid, 343.
25 ibid, 347. Cf Luntz, above note 15, (his researches identified some Commonwealth
cases in which a bank did successfully bring a claim against the payee).
26 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, ss 59,80.
27 Continental Caoutchouc and Gutta Percha Company v Kleinzwort, Sons and Co. (1904) 90
LT 474 (CA); Kleinwort, Sons and Co. v Dunlop Rubber Company (1907) 97 LT 263 (HL).
28 Barclays Bank [1980] QB 677, 703
29 B. Liggett (Liverpool) Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1928] 1 KB 48 (KB). See generally
Ellinger and Lee, "The 'Liggett' Defence: a banker's last resort" [1984] 1 LMCLQ
459.
30 [1939] Ch 286 (CA).
31 Subsequent English courts have expressed a preference for the Cleadon Trust
approach. See Crantrave Ltd (In Liq) v Lloyds Bank plc [2000] 3 WLR 877 (CA). This
is in contrast to Australian courts, see Majesty Restaurant Pty Ltd (In Liq) v
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1998) 47 NSWLR 593.
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C. A Case For The "Reasonable Expectation Approach"
1. Overview
The Court's reasoning in Barclays Bank is attractive. It explains why generally
a mistaken payment is recoverable. But, as the Court recognises, there are
situations when recovery is not appropriate.3 2 The "reasonable expectation"
approach adds to the list of situations when recovery is not appropriate.
This recognition of a new exception is needed (and justified) because a payment
arising from a bank's failure to action a stop-payment instruction is a more
complex situation than the typical mistaken payment. The payee is expecting
payment in discharge of a debt. Payment then comes from the debtor's agent.
And the debtor's agent is a bank. The bank's involvement in the payment process
is crucial. A key aspect of the bank-customer relationship is that the bank
undertakes "to honour the customer's cheques when the account is in credit"
33
or within an agreed overdraft level. Similar undertakings apply to other payment
instructions. These undertakings underlie the payee's expectation that payment
by the bank is the culmination of the payment process. Moreover they make this
expectation a reasonable one to hold. As Hedley has observed, albeit in a different
context, "no-one in the payee's position could suppose that the payment was
made other than on the basis that it discharged the bank's duty to their client.",
The bank's agency is a significant policy consideration supporting the
recognition of the "reasonable expectation" approach.3 1 In the next section the
bank's role as an agent is further explored. This leads into an examination of
case law which illustrates judicial recognition that the fact of payment through
an agent, as opposed to whether the payment was authorised, is an important
consideration in determining the rights of an innocent payee.
A second significant policy consideration supporting the recognition of the
"reasonable expectation" approach is the desirability of finality in payment of
commercial transactions. There is an inter-relationship between this consideration
and that of agency. The need for finality in bank payments is expressly recognised
in U.S. law. The U.S. position and common law recognition of the need for finality
is considered in the subsequent section.
2. The bank's role as agent
The bank-customer relationship is a complex relationship. This is because it is
comprised of a number of distinct relationships. Since Foley v Hill36 a
"conventiona[1]" 37 starting point for analysing the bank - customer relationship
is the contractual creditor - debtor relationship. But, as their Lordships in Foley
32 [1980] QB 677, 695.
33 London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd v Macmillan [1918] AC 777, 789 (HL) per Lord Findlay
LC.
34 Division and Ordering, above note 16, 20; Schall, above note 4, 129.
35 But see Robert Stevens, "Why do agents "drop out"?" [2005] LMCLQ 101 who
argues that (at least) where the issue is whether the agent is their principal's alter
ego, agency does not provide policy reasons for modifying general legal principles.
36 2 HLC 28; 9 ER 1002 at 36-37; 1005-1006.
37 Majesty Restaurant (1998) 47 NSWLR 593, 602.
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recognised, other relationships may arise.3 Another core relationship is that of
mandate. As is noted earlier, the bank must honour its customer's lawful payment
instructions, funds permitting. The reasoning in Barclays Bank focuses on the
presence or absence of the customer's mandate. In so doing it downplays the
significance of yet another core relationship: agency.
A bank acts as the customer's agent when it collects a cheque 9 or pays out on
the customer's cheque. 40 Moreover, the bank is known by the payee to be
performing an intermediary role when it pays out on its customer's cheque4" or
other payment instruction. Agency principles suggest that a payee who has given
value for a payment, and is ignorant of the stop-payment instruction, should be
entitled to rely on the bank's ostensible authority to pay money on its customer's
behalf and retain the payment. So said the New South Wales Supreme Court in
Majesty Restaurant Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Commonwealth Bank of Australia.42 There the
bank paid out on its customer's cheques drawn in favour of trade creditors,
mistakenly overlooking that the cheques bore only one of the two required
signatures.
Mainstream U.S. law also recognises the importance of the agency aspect of
the bank - customer relationship. An example is the so-called "discharge for
value" rule. This rule is considered in the next section. In essence it protects
recipients of cheques mistakenly honoured by a bank contrary to a stop-payment
instruction. As summarised in a leading text, the position in the U.S. is that:
"[w]here a bank receives in the ordinary course of business a che[que] drawn
upon it, presented by a bona fide holder, who is without notice of the fact that
payment has been stopped, and pays the amount of the che[que] to such holder, it
cannot afterwards recover back the money as paid by mistake."43
Compared to the U.S. position, English courts (and courts applying English
law) dealing with mistaken bank payments have been circumspect in their
recognition of the importance of the agency component of the bank - customer
relationship. For example the "rule in Price v Neal"44 (and its more modern
interpretation, the "rule in Cocks v Masterman") is consistent with a recognition
of the bank's agency role. But, despite this recognition, the courts have been
38 2 HLC 28; 9 ER 1002 at 43-44; 1008.
39 Mark Hapgood QC, ed, Paget's Law of Banking, 12 ed, (Butterworths, London 2003),
para 22.2.
40 Scholfield v Londesborough [1896] AC 514 (HL), Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926)
43 TLR 124,126; Majesty Restaurant (1998) 47 NSWLR 593,602. Paget's Law of Banking,
ibid, para 18.3.
41 Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926) 43 TLR 124, 126; Majesty Restaurant (1998) 47
NSWLR 593 (SC NSW), 601-602. It is because the bank is the customer's agent, as
opposed to an independent party with its own distinct liability on the cheque (ie
an acceptor), that the customer has the ability to give a stop-payment order, see M
Brindle and R Cox (ed), Law of Bank Payments, 3rd ed (Sweet & Maxwell, London,
2004), para 7-278. Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s 75.
42 (1998) 47 NSWLR 593, 602.
43 Michie on Banks and Banking, (LEXIS Law Pub, Charlottesville, VA, 2002) § 230.
4 (1762) 3 Burr 1355; 97 ER 871 (KB).
215
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suspicious of the rule. As we shall see this suspicion is most apparent (and rightly
so) when a forgery is involved.
45
Despite their caution, there are cases in which the courts have recognised the
importance of a payment being made by an agent. This section considers three
of these cases: Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica46 ("Dextra Bank"),
Watson v Russell,47 and RE Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd.41 None of these cases
involves a bank overlooking a stop-payment instruction. But they all involve
analogous situations. All three cases involve mistaken payments. All involve
three parties. And, an issue in all three cases is the ability of the recipient to
retain the payment. In two of the cases one of the parties was an agent of another
party and in implementing its principal's payment exceeded its authority. The
recipient was held entitled to retain the payment. In the third case there was no
agent. Recovery was ordered. We start with the most recent case - Dextra Bank.
Dextra Bank
The facts of Dextra Bank are complex. Both Dextra and the Bank of Jamaica
were the objects of a scam. Pursuant to the scam Dextra thought it was making
a loan, while the Bank of Jamica thought it was purchasing foreign currency.
The case highlights the importance of an agent's apparent authority to make a
payment to determining the recipient's liability.
Payment in that case was through the medium of a cheque. Dextra drew a
cheque (for what it thought was a loan) and then gave possession of the cheque
to its agent. Dextra specifically instructed its agent not to hand the cheque over
to the Bank of Jamaica unless he received an executed promissory note in return.49
But the agent was part of the scam, and he did not follow these instructions.
In finding for the Bank of Jamacia (the payee) their Lordships, following the
approach in Watson v Russell, considered it significant that the Bank did not
know of the agent's limited authority. The result was that the Bank of Jamaica
was entitled to rely on the agent's apparent authority and retain the payment.
The advice of the Privy Council in this case was given by Lord Goff and Lord
Bingham. In so doing their Lordships expressly recognised the importance of
agency principles. They suggested that agency principles may be a "stronger
doctrine of law" 5 capable of excluding the application of unjust enrichment
principles. Alternatively, they suggested that agency principles are capable of
modifying the application of unjust enrichment principles in particular
circumstances. This recognition is important since in Barclays Bank the Court
did not consider agency principles and suggested that either unjust enrichment
45 This is a consequence of English law's subsequent treatment of Price v Neal, see
text accompanying n91 - n99.
46 [2001] UKPC 50; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193.
47 (1862) 3 B & S 34; 122 ER 14; affd (1864) 5 B & S 968, 122 ER 1090.
48 [19261 AC 670 (HL).
49 Dextra Bank [20011 UKPC 50; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at para [10].
50 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [20031 EWCA Civ 1446; [2004]
1 All ER (Comm) 193 at para [192] per Sealey LJ.
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principles apply or contractual principles apply. This point is developed further
in Part D.
Watson v Russell
Russell had chartered a ship to Keys. In turn Keys sub-chartered the ship to a
third party. Keys did this through Watson. The hire to Russell was in arrears.
Watson gave Keys a cheque for one half of the arrears and instructed Keys to
conditionally deliver the cheque to Russell. The condition was that the cheque
was tendered on the basis that Russell would not terminate the hire. For the
purpose of delivering the cheque Keys was Watson's agent. Keys omitted to
inform Russell of the condition. Russell kept the cheque and terminated the
hire. The Court concluded that Russell was entitled to do so. In delivering the
Court's judgment, Crompton J observed that the cheque was "one which [the
holder] ha[d] a right to take".-" This illustrates judicial recognition that a payee's
reasonable reliance on the validity of a cheque or bill is an important factor in
determining whether the payee has acquired rights to it.
RE Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd
Dextra and Watson v Russell can be contrasted profitably with RE Jones Ltd v
Waring & Gillow Ltd. There the result was different; the Court considered that
the payee was not entitled to rely on the circumstances surrounding the payment
to justify their continued retention of the payment. The key factual difference
appears to be that the purported agent - Bodenham - was not the payer's agent.
52
Waring & Gillow Ltd were the recipients of a payment from RE Jones Ltd
("Jones"). In making this payment, Jones - encouraged by Bodenham's false
representations that he was an agent of a car manufacturer - believed that it was
paying a deposit on the purchase of some cars. In fact Bodenham owed money
to Waring & Gillow Ltd and, by falsely representing to Jones that Waring &
Gillow Ltd was involved with the car manufacturer, he initiated a process by
which Jones made a payment to Waring & Gillow Ltd. Upon learning the truth,
Jones successfully recovered this payment from Waring & Gillow Ltd.53
This result, while different from those in Dextra Bank and Watson v Russell, is
consistent with the reasoning in those cases. Collectively these three cases show
the importance of payment occurring through the medium of an agent.
51 Watson v Russell (1862) 3 B & S 34; 122 ER 14; affd (1864) 5 B & S 968, 122 ER 1090
at 38-39.
52 RE Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd. [1926] AC 670,694 (per Lord Sumner); 700 (per
Lord Carson); Dextra Bank 12001] UKPC 50; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at para
[24]; Sutton, "Mistake: Symbol, Metaphor and Unfolding" [20021 RLR 9, n113. Cf
Schall, above note 4, 117.
An important development since this case is the recognition of the change of
position defence. If recognised in 1926 this defence should have been available to
Waring & Gillow Ltd. On receipt of the payment from Jones, Waring & Gillow Ltd
had released goods to Bodenham which it had earlier repossessed. At the time
these proceedings were brought the goods were much less valuable.
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3. Commercial finality
Finality in payment of commercial transactions is a second significant policy
consideration supporting the recognition of the "reasonable expectation"
approach. Dextra Bank illustrates that the courts take into account this
consideration. Their Lordships recognised that people of commerce regard, and
rely on, a completed payment transaction (there a cheque) as being final: "the
commercial reality [is] that cheques are treated as the equivalent of cash.
s5 4
Indeed, looking beyond restitution generally, to the law of negotiable instruments
and electronic fund transfers,55 one finds a shift in focus in which the law places
more emphasis on finality of payment, especially when value has been given.
This is particularly true in the U.S. where the "discharge for value" rule has
received widespread recognition, for example, in the Restatement (First) of
Restitution 56 and in the Revised Uniform Commercial Code.
57
The U.S. "discharge for value" rule
This rule was considered recently by Dr Schal5 as part of his comparison of
Barclays Bank with Banque Worms v BankAmerica International,5 9 a decision of the
New York Court of Appeals. The facts in these cases are similar. Each bank had
overlooked a customer's stop-payment instruction and, from the payee's
perspective, each payment was one to which the payee was entitled. A minor
54 Dextra Bank, [2001] UKPC 50; [20021 1 All ER (Comm) 193, at para [18].
55 Esso Petroleum Co v Milton [1997] 2 All ER 593 (CA).
56 Section 14 provides:
"(1) A creditor of another ... who has received from a third party any benefit
in discharge of the debt ... is under no duty to make restitution therefor,
although the discharge was given by mistake of the transferor as to his interests
or duties, if the transferee made no misrepresentation and did not have notice
of the transferor's mistake."
In addition section 33 provides:
"The holder of a check or other bill of exchange who, having paid value in
good faith therefore, is under no duty of restitution to him although the drawee
pays because of a mistaken belief that he is otherwise under a duty to pay."
The Restatement of Restitution is in the process of being redrafted. Current drafts
of what will be the Restatement (Third) of Restitution suggest there will be no
fundamental change to its position on a discharge for value rule. See generally,
Tentative Draft No. 1, § 7 cmt. d. linking the Restatement position to that of the
RUCC § 3-418 (see text accompanying n122-n124).
57 Uniform Laws Annotated, § 3-418(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided, in subsection (c), if the drawee of a draft pays ... the
draft and the drawee acted on the mistaken belief that (i) payment of the draft
had not been stopped pursuant to Section 4-403 or (ii)... the drawee may
recover the amount of the draft from the person to whom or for whose benefit
payment was made ... Rights of the drawee under this subsection are not
affected by failure of the drawee to exercise reasonable care in paying or
accepting the draft."
The 1991 Revision to §3-418 introduced the phrase "a person who in good faith
took the instrument for value" omitting the former reference to "holder in due
course."
58 Schall, above note 4.
59 570 NE 2d 189 (1990, NY CA).
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difference is the different payment mechanisms - a cheque (in Barclays Bank) in
contrast to a wire transfer (in Banque Worms). The major difference is the result;
in Banque Worms the payee was held entitled to retain the payment. 60
Dr Schall has suggested that Banque Worms was wrongly decided.61 One of Dr
Schall's concerns is whether the debt in Banque Worms was discharged. Dr Schall
considers that the "discharge for value" rule operates similarly to the "good
consideration" defence recognised in Barclays Bank. The "good consideration"
defence operates to protect a payee who has given consideration for the bank's
mistaken payment. Discharge of the customer's debt constitutes consideration,
but mere receipt by the creditor/payee of the payment is insufficient to do so.
The Court in Banque Worms did not consider whether the debt was discharged.
Dr Schall considers that the Court "must implicitly have assumed a valid
discharge of the debt".62 He regards this implicit discharge as "particularly
doubtful".
63
Dr Schall may be right in suggesting similarities between these defences. But
U.S. lawyers take a wider view of the scope of the "discharge for value" rule. In
essence, U.S. courts do not seem to require the legal discharge of the debt. Rather
the "discharge for value" rule is seen as responding to the creditor/payee's receipt
of payment from the debtor's bank in circumstances where the debtor owes a
debt to the payee. As a consequence, U.S. law does not require the debtor's
consent to, or subsequent ratification of, the payment. The reasoning in Banque
Worms is consistent with this. The Court did not consider whether the creditor
had requested or subsequently ratified the payment because it did not have to.
In a passage quoted by Dr Schall, 6 the Court in Banque Worms referred to a
payee who is "entitled to" the payment. But in so doing the Court was not
considering whether the payee was entitled to the payment because the
customer's debt had been discharged. Rather it was drawing a distinction
between volunteers and those who have given value. And, in this context, value
has a wide meaning. As Palmer observes, "[i]n considering the defense of
discharge for value, courts are almost wholly committed to the view that the
receipt of the plaintiff's funds in payment of or as security for the debt of a third
person is value".65 The result is that U.S. law gives much greater protection to
non-voluntary payees than that conferred by the reasoning in Barclays Bank.
Typically U.S. law provides relief for the bank by subrogating it to the payee's
claim against the customer.66 But this is just one of the rights U.S. law subrogates
6 Cf Wilson v Newman 617 NW 2d 318 (Mich. SC, 2000). See generally A Kull,
"Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor" 81 Boston U L Rev 919,922-923
(2001) ("Kull, Defenses"), 932-933.




65 G E Palmer, The Law of Restitution (Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1978), Vol III,
("Palmer, Restitution"), §16.6.
Schall, above note 4, 115. Professor Birks has suggested that English law should
recognise that the bank be "subrogated to the creditor's unextinguished claim
against the customer", Unjust Enrichment, above note 3, 296.
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to the bank. The effect of the Uniform Commercial Code67 is that the bank is
"subrogate[d] ... to whatever valid claims its mistaken payment may have
happened to have discharged". 61 These claims may be that of the payee against
the customer, and vice versa. 69 Any shortfall is borne by the bank.
Not surprisingly a leading U.S. academic suggests that Barclays Bank was
"wrongly decided. 70 Of course, "different societies can quite reasonably operate
under different rules with no untoward consequences". 71 So the mere fact that
U.S. law applies different principles is not decisive. But it does show that the
result in Barclays Bank is not the only possible one. It also shows that the banking
industry can cope with a different regime.
U.S. acceptance of the rule in Price v Neil
A factor which makes the U.S. "discharge for value" rule particularly significant
for lawyers in the English law tradition is that U.S. lawyers regard the English
case of Price v Neal both as the guiding influence behind the rule,72 and as
underlying the general emphasis which U.S. law places on finality in payment.
Price was the drawee of two forged bills of exchange. The bills were indorsed
to the defendant "for a valuable consideration". Price paid out the first bill to
the defendant and accepted the second bill. When the forgery was subsequently
discovered Price unsuccessfully sought to recover the payments from the
defendant.
Later English courts (and courts applying English law) have viewed Price v
Neal with some suspicion. In contrast,73 U.S. courts have largely embraced Price
67 Revised Uniform Commercial Code (1991), §4-407.
A Kull, "Rationalizing Restitution", 83 Calif L Rev 1191, 1229 (1995) ("Kull,
Restitution"), 1229; Guarantee Bank & Trust v Smith, 952 SW 2d 787 (Mo. CA 1997).
69 A practical problem with this solution is that the bank may seek to enforce rights
of which it has little knowledge. A similar problem arises when a debt is sold. A
solution is to require the customer's participation (if necessary) in any proceedings,
for example by supplying the bank with all the information it needs. U.S. law
achieves that by requiring the customer to show the fact and amount of its loss
arising from the bank's failure to follow the stop-payment instruction, see Revised
Uniform Commercial Code (1991), §4-403; E Rubin, "Efficiency, Equity and the
Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4", 42 Alabama L Rev 451, 578 (1991).
70 Kull, Restitution, above note 68, 1229.
71 S Worthington, Equity, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), ("Equity"), 6.
72 Uniform Laws Annotated, §3-418, cmt. 1.
73 For general review of the differing reception of Price v Neal in U.S. and English
law see S B Dow and N S Ellis, "The Payor Bank's Right to Recover Mistaken
Payments: Survival of Common Law Restitution Under Proposed Revisions to
Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4", 65 Ind L J 779 (1990); S B Dow,
"Restitution of Payments on Cheques with Forged Drawers' Signatures: Loss
Allocation under English Law", (1996) 4 RLR 27; S B Dow, "The Doctrine of Price
v Neal in English and American Forgery Law: A Comparative Analysis", 6 Tul J
Int'l & Comp L 113 (1998); D H van Zyle, "Unauthorised Payment in Unjust
Enrichment in Banking Law", in F D Rose ed, Restitution and Banking Law
(Mansfield Press, Oxford, 1998).
Otago Law Review
Mistaken Bank Payments: Commercial Certainty Counts
v Neal. Illustrative of this, they have extended its operation beyond forged bills.
In the U.S. the reasoning in Price v Neal applies to a range of transactions. These
include: forged cheques; raised cheques; payment where there have been no
funds or the account has been closed; and stopped cheques.74
U.S. commentators advance a range of policy arguments in support of this
expansion. Three are considered here. Of these, the need for commercial finality
is seen as the strongest policy argument.75 Indeed, commentators have identified
two factors which support the argument for finality. The first factor is that banks
are viewed as sophisticated organisations, typically more sophisticated than the
payee. Because of a bank's sophistication, U.S. commentators recognise that its
mistakes may be "more complicated" 76 than those of an individual. But they
consider that this places the bank in a "superior position"' to set-off the cost of
the mistake. Moreover they consider that a bank is more likely to respond to
incentives to avoid making "wasteful" 78 mistakes. The second factor recognises
both the reliance a payee places on payment from the debtor's bank and the
difficulty the payee may have in showing a change of position in reliance on the
payment. The U.S. position can be seen as giving the payee "a protected interest
based on the likelihood of difficult-to-prove reliance on the mistaken payment".
79
The remaining two policy arguments raised in support of the expansion in the
application of Price v Neal are directed to specific concerns.B First, so as to explain
the expansion to forged cheques, it is argued that a bank is in a superior position
to detect unauthorised transactions, especially forgeries. The last concern is directed
to the situations of insufficient funds, no account and stopped cheques. It is argued
that the bank has a superior ability to know the state of the customer's account.
U.S. acceptance of the general approach in Barclays Bank
A factor making Banque Worms of further interest for lawyers in the English
law tradition, is, as Dr Schall observed, the court's "concentrat[ion] on the conflict
between ... colliding principles"8 - there the so-called "mistake of fact doctrine"
and the "discharge for value" rule.
The "mistake of fact doctrine" is the general response of New York law to
mistaken payments. It is similar to Barclays Bank in that its two underlying
premises are (i) that restitutionary relief should be available to recover payments
made under a mistake of fact and (ii) that the change of position defence provides
relief against injustice to the recipient. In contrast, the "discharge for value" rule
does not apply to all cases of mistaken payment, but rather to the so-called "exotic
cases" 82 where a third party (typically a bank), in the mistaken belief that it is
74 Palmer, Restitution, above note 65, § 14.24.
75 ibid.




79 ibid, 180"(his emphasis).
so Palmer, Restitution, above note 65, § 14.24.
81 Schall, above note 4, 113.
82 Kull, Defenses, above note 60, 929.
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under a duty to a third party (typically the bank's customer) to do so, makes a
payment to another who is owed money by that third party.
In Banque Worms the Court rejected the application of the "mistake of fact
doctrine" in favour of the "discharge for value" rule. In so doing the Court
distinguished the cases supporting the "mistake of fact doctrine" on the ground
that "for the most part" they "present[ed] issues involving more traditional
aspects of mistake and restitution".83 It will be recalled that the payment in this
case was implemented through a wire transfer. The Court also noted this fact to
support its rejection of the "mistake of fact doctrine". The relative speed of
electronic transfers was also mentioned." A third factor recognised by the Court
as warranting the application of the "discharge for value" rule was to
"[e]stablishing finality"85 in payment mechanisms. The ALI had considered
finality to be "a singularly important policy goal"86 when it approved article 4A
of the Uniform Commercial Code (which governs wire transfers).
The following extract from Banque Worms reveals the emphasis the Court places
on "finality in business transactions".87 While the extract is directed to wire
transfers, similar concerns apply to cheques. The Court observed:88
"A consequence of this concern [for finality] has been the adoption of a rule which
precludes recovery from a third person, who as the result of the mistake of one or
both of the parties to an original transaction receives payment by one of them in
good faith in the ordinary course of business and for a valuable consideration ...
This rule is grounded in 'considerations of public policy and convenience for the
protection and encouragement of trade and commerce by guarding the security
and certainty of business transactions, since to hold otherwise would obviously
introduce confusion and danger into all commercial dealings' ....
The 'discharge for value' rule is consistent with and furthers the policy goal of
finality in business transactions and may appropriately be applied in respect to
electronic funds transfers. When a beneficiary receives money to which it is entitled
and has no knowledge that the money was erroneously wired, the beneficiary
should not have to wonder whether it may retain the funds; rather, such a
beneficiary should be able to consider the transfer of funds as a final and complete
transaction, not subject to revocation."
The common law response to the rule in Price v Neal
We return to English Law. As intimated earlier, Price v Neal's emphasis on
finality has not received the same level of acceptance as it has in the U.S.. Indeed,
to the contrary, Price v Neal has been viewed with suspicion. Despite some early
extension to the situation where a drawee's acceptance was forged and the
drawee's banker had honoured the bill,89 subsequent judicial views have






89 Smith v Mercer (1815) 6 Taunt 76; 128 ER 961 (CP).
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fluctuated on its merits, and its reasoning has been subsumed by a later case
purporting to explain its operation - Cocks v Masterman.90 Nevertheless, the U.S.
position, in particular its acceptance of Price v Neal, makes it worthwhile for
lawyers in the English tradition to re-evaluate, with some caution, this line of
authority.
To date English courts have struggled to formulate a rationale to explain the
operation of the rules in Price v Neal and Cocks v Masterman; why is the payee
protected? Various mixes of estoppel and negligence (ie for failing to detect the
forgery) have been advanced. But with one noticeable exception, a commercial
rationale, even a narrow one - ie to encourage the circulation of commercial
paper - has not been advanced. The closest (and probably the high-point in the
acceptance of Cocks v Masterman) occurs in The London & River Plate Bank, Ltd v
The Bank of Liverpool, Ltd.91 In that case a bill contained some forged endorsements.
The acceptor paid out, and then, some time later, discovered the forgeries.
Stressing commercial considerations Mathew J held that the acceptor could not
recover. The following passage is worthy of note:92
"That rule [Cocks v Masterman] is obviously, as it seems to me, indispensable for
the conduct of business. A holder of a bill cannot possibly fail to have his position
affected if there be any interval of time during which he holds the money as his
own, or spends it as his own, and if he is subsequently sought to be made
responsible to hand it back. It may be that no legal right may be compromised by
reason of the payment. For instance, the acceptor may pay the bill and discover
on the same day that the bill is a forgery, and so inform the holder of it, so that the
holder would have time to give notice of dishonour to the other parties to the bill;
but even in such a case it is manifest that the position of a man of business may be
most seriously compromised, even by the delay of a day. Now that clear rule is
one that ought not to be tampered with. It is one of the few rules of business
which is perfectly clear and distinct at present, and, as it seems to me, is
unimpeachable."
But this revival was short-lived. In Imperial Bank of Canada v Bank of Hamilton
93
the amount of a certified cheque was fraudulently increased after certification.
The innocent recipient deposited the cheque in his account. His bank allowed
him to access these funds prior to the drawee bank honouring the cheque. Not
wishing to extend the rule in Cocks v Masterman to this situation, the Privy Council
labelled the rule as "stringent 94 and suggested that it applied only to negotiable
instruments where notice of dishonour was required. Despite this reasoning,
their Lordships' concern appears to have been directed to the operation of a
finality rule where the recipient does not rely on the payment. But this appears
to be confusing a finality rule with the change of position defence. U.S. law
90 (1829) 9 B & C 902; 109 ER 335. This case narrowed the operation of Price v Neal to
the situation where an acceptor pays a bill and allows the recipient to retain the
payment for a day.
91 [1896] 1 QB 7 (QB). See also Bank of Montreal v The King (1907) 38 SCR 258 (SC
Can).
92 ibid, 11-12.
93 [1903] AC 49 (PC).
94 ibid, 58.
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recognises that the "discharge for value" rule and the change of position defence
protect against different mischiefs. 95 To repeat an earlier observation, U.S.
commentators suggest that the "discharge for value" rule gives the payee "a
protected interest based on the likelihood of difficult-to-prove reliance on the
mistaken payment".
96
The attack on Cocks v Masterman continued in National Westminster Bank Ltd v
Barclays Bank International Ltd.97 Here the drawer's signature on a cheque was
forged. Kerr J considered that the rule in Cocks v Masterman applied only to
"negotiable instruments proper, ie instruments which are not mere forgeries in
toto but contain at least one genuine signature and which have been negotiated
to at least one innocent holder."98 More recently, and Barclays Bank99 is an example,
there has been an attempt to subsume Cocks v Masterman within a change of
position defence.
This review may suggest that English courts (and courts applying English
law) view a finality defence, especially with respect to cheques, with hostility.
But care must be taken in drawing this conclusion. The cases involved forged
cheques - shams - and not mistakenly paid stopped cheques. It can be argued
that in dealing with forged cheques the courts regard the complete absence of
any mandate as crucial - there is never a valid transaction between the purported
drawer and payee. Forgery may be said to unravel everything. Moreover, as a
general principle the law distinguishes between transactions that are never valid
and those which are or can be valid. Consider the difference between void and
voidable contracts,'00 for example, or converting a valid cheque °1' as opposed
to forging a drawer's signature1 2 or materially altering the cheque. 103 For this
reason the "reasonable expectation" approach recognises an exception for forged
payment instructions. 4 The fact that the reasoning in Barclays Bank focuses on
95 Kull, Defences, above note 60, 929.
96 Alleviating Mistakes, above note 76, 180 (his emphasis).
97 [1975] QB 654.
98 ibid, 670. Another case involving a forged payee's signature is The Imperial Bank of
India v Abeyesinghe (1927) Ceylon LR 257 (Gavin J dissenting).
99 [1980] QB 677, 703. See also Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 584, 579
(Lord Goff).
100 Morison v London County and Westminster Bank Ltd [191413 KB 356,379, (CA); Lloyds
Bank Ltd v Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China [19291 1 KB 40, 55-56, (CA)
(cheque is deemed to have a value equal to its face value).
101 Equity, above note 71, 189. "This distinction [between void and voidable contracts]
is clearly important for third parties. They are better protected if the initial contract
is voidable rather than void. This is as it should be, given that the initial contract
appears to outsiders to be a perfectly proper contract."
102 Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81, 87,103-104, (SC
Can) (holding that since the 'cheque' is not a valid cheque/ bill of exchange, a
collecting bank has no liability for the amount for its face value).
103 Smith v Lloyds TSB Group plc [2001] QB 541, 557 (CA). But see Agip (Africa) Ltd v
Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 385 (CA).
104 This reflects a marked policy difference between English law and U.S. law. In the
U.S. the importance of transactional finality is seen as warranting protection for
the payee, at least where the payee "took the instrument in good faith and for
value" (or has a change of position defence) (§ 3-418(c) RUCC), and had no
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the presence or absence of the customer's mandate, rather than whether a
mandate ever existed is significant; it suggests that the approach in that case is
unable to discern factors which have influenced courts.
To conclude this section, a court mindful of developing a finality defence
applicable to a mistakenly overlooked stop-payment instruction need not be
intimidated by the suspicion courts applying English law have given to Price v
Neal and Cocks v Masterman. Indeed, to the contrary, in addition to emphasising
the difference between a sham cheque and one that was initially valid, the cases
reveal two important considerations - the giving of value and lack of notice of
the irregularity. Both are reflected within the "reasonable expectation" approach.
D. Assumptions Underlying The Reasoning In Barclays Bank
1. The assumptions
Barclays Bank is such an important case that it is insufficient merely to provide
the positive case for the "reasonable expectation" approach. This Part examines
four questionable assumptions on which its reasoning and result are based. These
assumptions are important for they have the effect of overlooking agency
principles and downplaying the need for commercial certainty in payment
mechanisms - considerations which underlie the "reasonable expectation"
approach.
But first, three assumptions in Barclays Bank which the "reasonable expectation"
approach either accepts or does not question directly should be noted. First, the
"reasonable expectation" approach does not question the imposition of a prima
facie restitutionary liability upon the payee to restore an equivalent sum of money.
The bank does not intend to make a gift but believes it is discharging a liability,
albeit to its customer. So even without the need to recognise a right of recovery
for causative mistakes, the bank should have a primafacie right of recovery.
10 5
But the "reasonable expectation" approach differs from Barclays Bank in
recognising that the circumstances of the (albeit mistaken) payment justify the
recognition of a defence.0 6 These circumstances include the fact the bank is
making the payment as an agent and the general desirability for finality in the
payment system.
Second, the "reasonable expectation" approach does not deny the assumption
that the debtor's request or subsequent ratification is required before a payment
by a third party to a creditor can legally discharge the debt. Whether or not this
is the law, or should be the law, is irrelevant for the "reasonable expectation"
approach. But it should be noted that the apparent symmetry between the
knowledge that the signature was unauthorised. Despite this § 3-417 of the RUCC
implies a number of so-called 'presentment warranties', which include a warranty
that the person obtaining payment "has no knowledge that the signature of the
drawer of the draft is unauthorised": § 3-417(a)(3).
105 Division and Ordering, above note 16, 19; Goff & ]ones, above note 8, paras 4-012 to
4-016.
106 Kleinwort Benson [199912 AC 349,388 per Lord Goff (particular sets of circumstances
.. [may] as a matter of principle or policy, ... lead to the conclusion that recovery
should not be allowed").
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approach in Barclays Bank and current restitutionary theory as to the payment of
another's debt is bought at a price. In particular it encourages the assumption
that in the absence of the change of position defence, the payee can only retain
the payment if the debt is legally discharged. In so doing it precludes the
recognition of other justifications for the payee retaining the money. On the
"reasonable expectation" approach, the payee's ability to retain the bank's
payment is not dependent on the customer's debt being discharged. Rather, the
circumstances surrounding the payment provide the justification.
Third, the "reasonable expectation" approach does not question the result
predicted in Barclays Bank where the bank's mistake is one of sufficiency of funds
and the customer owes the money to the payee. This occurred in Lloyds Bank plc
v Independent Insurance Co Ltd.10 7 The court held that the payee was entitled to
retain the money. Earlier authorities support this result.108 Barclays Bank suggests
that this result arises because the payee has given good consideration for the
bank's payment. Recently Dr Schall has criticised this aspect of Barclays Bank.
This criticism appears sound. Just because a bank has its customer's mandate to
make a payment does not mean that it has their authority to discharge a debt.
Typically the bank has no idea why a payment is being made; all it knows is that
it has received (or believes it has received) instructions to make a payment.' 9 If
the law is to regard the mistaken payment in this situation as non-recoverable
something else must be present. Dr Schall suggests a "no duplication rule". 1" 0
Whether that is correct, non-recovery is also the result predicted by the
"reasonable expectation" approach.
2. Questionable assumptions
There are four inter-related assumptions in Barclays Bank which the "reasonable
expectation" approach challenges. They involve:
(i) its classification of the bank's claim as either restitutionary or as coming
within a "contractual regime";"'
(ii) its choices in determining the content of a category;
(iii) its emphasis on the customer's mandate; and
(iv) its emphasis on the position of the paying bank.
An either-or approach
The approach in Barclays Bank regards as mutually exclusive the restitutionary
regime dealing with mistaken payments and the contractual regime, which
focuses on the customer's mandate. Moreover since the approach in Barclays
Bank considers that a customer's revocation of its mandate precludes the
107 [2000] QB 110 (CA). There a bank actioned a funds transfer given by its customer
in the mistaken belief that cheques deposited into its customer's account had
cleared. The recipient was a creditor of the customer.
108 Chambers v Miller (1862) 32 LJCP 30 (CP); Pollard v Bank of England (1871) LR 6 QB
623 (CA).
109 Schall, above note 4, 116.110 ibid, 124.
1 Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The "Trident Beauty") [1994] 1 All ER
470,473 (HL).
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application of the contractual regime, the contractual regime does not apply in
the stop-payment situation. The restitutionary regime must then apply. This is
important because, unlike the contractual regime, the restitutionary regime
discounts the need for finality in payment transactions. In contrast, through the
"good consideration" defence, the contractual regime provides a limited
recognition of this need for finality.
The fundamental problem with this 'either-or' approach is that it assumes the
law can be neatly classified. The truth is that in many situations courts are faced
with competing policies. 112 For example a bank payment in ignorance of a stop-
payment instruction can be classified in a number of ways. Three classifications
come to mind. First, it can be classified as a mistaken payment. Second, it can be
classified as a bank purporting to pay another's (its customer's) debts. Third, it
can be classified as a situation where the bank is the customer's agent for the
purposes of making payments and acts within its apparent authority when so
doing. By classifying the stop-payment situation as coming within the
restitutionary regime of mistaken payments, the Court in Barclay's Bank discounts
the other possibilities, and the policy issues they raise.
The Court's treatment of the "rule in Cocks v Masterman""3 illustrates the power
of classification to emphasize some policy considerations while discounting
others. In Barclays Bank the Court offers a restitutionary explanation for this rule,
by which its operation is subsumed within a change of position defence. 14 The
result is to reserve revoked payments solely for restitutionary principles;
principles which, as perceived by the Court in Barclays Bank, are not sympathetic
to all the competing policies and concerns which are present in this situation.
Creating the categories
An important preliminary step in classifying is identifying the dominant
features (eg policy considerations and issues of principle) in a range of situations.
These features define the membership of a category and distinguish that category
from others. A risk in identifying the dominant features of a category (ie the law
of restitution) or a sub-category thereof (ie mistaken payments) is that the
importance of a particular feature can be overestimated. A feature can be
misperceived as a mandatory feature when it is merely a common or typical
feature. In this process other situations may be marginalised or required to
conform to the typical one.
The typical mistaken payment arises in a two party situation. For example, I
pay you mistakenly believing that I owe you this money. Kelly v Solari'
1 5




that the mistaken payor's carelessness in making the payment is irrelevant. But
112 R J Sutton, "'We Just Mislaid It': The Great Project and the Problem of Order in
Private Law" (2005) 11 Otago LR 97, 103.
113 (1829) 9 B & C 902; 109 ER 335 (KB).
114 Barclays Bank [1980] QB 677,703, Lord Goff reiterated these views in Lipkin Gorman
v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 584, 579 (HL).
115 (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24.
116 Dextra Bank [20011 UKPC 50; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193, at para [45] per Lord
Goff.
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this does not mean that the payer's carelessness is irrelevant in other types of
mistaken payments, for example, mistakenly paid stopped cheques. Compared
to the typical two party situation, the three party stop-payment situation is more
complicated. Nevertheless, in Barclays Bank the Court analogises (inappropriately
I believe) to the typical two party mistaken payment claim.
As a result the reasoning in Barclays Bank pays insufficient regard to the context
in which the mistaken payment occurs in that case'1 7 - the bank's processing of
its customer's instruction to pay funds to the payee who is both expecting and
is "entitled to receive the payment",11 and in respect of which value has been
given.119 The reasoning in Barclays Bank also places too much emphasis on some
aspects of the bank-customer relationship (ie mandate) while overlooking other
important aspects (ie agency). And, the reasoning in Barclays Bank downplays
the need for certainty of receipt in commercial transactions.
The Court's treatment of Aitken v Short 20 in Barclays Bank further illustrates
the danger of classification. Aitken v Short is not a typical two party situation. To
the contrary it illustrates that mistakes occur in a range of contexts and the courts
may respond to a number of policy considerations. In Aitken v Short a bank had
a 'second' security over property which it and its debtor (Carter) believed was
Carter's. Short had the prior security Short sought repayment of the debt and
Carter "referred"12' him to the bank. The bank paid the debt confident that its
own security would thereby be enhanced. The bank then discovered that the
secured property did not belong to Carter. The bank unsuccessfully sought
repayment from Short. Prior to Barclays Bank an explanation for this result was
that the bank's mistake (assuming it was mistaken) did not justify recovery.
Support for this is provided by the well-known remarks of Bramwell B,
suggesting that restitutionary recovery is not available where the "mistake did
not lead him [ie the plaintiff payer] to believe that he was liable to pay the money
to the defendant."
122
But in Barclays Bank, the Court rejects this explanation. This is a consequence
of the Court enlarging restitutionary recovery to causative mistakes 23 The Court
offers the "good consideration" defence as the new explanation.24 This enables
the Court to reconcile the result in Aitken v Short with that in Barclays Bank. There
117 A Tettenbom, Law of Restitution in England and Ireland, 3rd ed (Cavendish, London,
2002) "(Tettenborn, Restitution"), 69 (para 3-1) (suggesting that the context is all
important and that "different mistakes may well need different treatment according
to the circumstances and the type of benefit involved").
118 Kleinworth Benson [1999] 2 AC 349, 408 (Lord Hope).
119 See generally Tettenbom, Restitution, above note, 117, 77 (para 3-15) for recognition
that the circumstances surrounding the payment and its receipt are relevant
considerations.
120 (1856) 1 H & N 210; 156 ER 1180.
121 ibid, at 214; 1181 per Pollock CB; at 215; 1182 per Platt B. From Carter's perspective,
his act of referring Short to the bank probably carried no legal significance; he did
not have any funds to pay the debt, nor did he care if the bank paid the debt and,
if so, why it did.
122 ibid, 215; 1182.
123 Barclays Bank [1980] QB 677, 688.
124 Unjust Enrichment, above note 3, 139.
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is support in Aitken v Short for the "good consideration" explanation. In the last
sentence of his speech, Pollock CB records that the "money was, in fact, paid by
the Bank, as the agents of Carter". 125 This suggests that the bank may have had
Carter's authority to pay his debt to Short.
But other explanations for the result in Aitken v Short remain. Some explain
the result on the basis that the bank made the payment to acquire the security. 126
Support for this explanation is present in all three of the brief judgments. 127 But
both Pollock CB and Platt B128 also note that Short had "a perfect right to receive
the money" 29 from Carter. The payment was made by Carter's bank, so the
result is consistent with the "reasonable expectation" approach.
The point is that Aitken v Short is a complex case. But through a process of
classification the Court in Barclays Bank fits (or is it forces) Aitken v Short into the
pattern of the typical two-party case.
Emphasising the importance of the customer's mandate
Mandate is a key aspect of the bank-customer relationship. Save where
exceptions or qualifications apply (ie sufficiency of funds), a bank's primary
function and duty130 is to honour its customer's mandate.131 But the reasoning
in Barclays Bank places too much emphasis on mandate. This arises as a by-
product of the underlying assumption that the payee's entitlement to retain the
payment turns on the bank's ability to debit the customer's account, which in
turn depends (at least initially) on its mandate to do so. 32 If there is no mandate
to pay, there is no contractual right to debit the account.
Having excluded the law of contract the dispute is then regarded as coming
within the restitutionary regime. The Court in Barclays Bank concludes that any
restitutionary claim has to be on the ground that by paying its customer's debt
the bank has enriched the customer. But save in special circumstances, 33 the
customer's mandate (evidencing their request to pay what is their debt) is seen
as required to legally discharge the debt. So, in the absence of a valid request the
bank is dependent on subsequent ratification for authorisation to debit the
account. The bank is treated as if it were an officious intermeddler purporting to
pay another's debt. Thus the bank is regarded as having no restitutionary claim
against the customer. As a corollary, while the payee may regard the payment as
125 Aitken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210; 156 ER 1180, at 214; 1182.
126 Schall, above note 4, 117. A variation of this is that the bank made the payment in
the belief that their security was adequate, see Birks, A Bank's Mistaken Payments:
Two Recent Cases and their Implications (2000) 6 NZBLQ 155, 158.
127 Aitken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210; 156 ER 1180; at 214; 1181 per Pollock CB; 215;
1182 per Bramwell B.
128 Platt B recorded that he was "of the same opinion" as Pollock CB, ibid, 215; 1182.
129 ibid, 214; 1181.
130 Dextra Bank [2001] UKPC 50; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 (PC) at para [32].
131 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28. Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3KB 110
(CA).
132 This assumes that the mistake was not so fundamental so as to stop title to the
money from passing.
133 ie Exall a Partridge (1799) 8 Term Rep 308; 101 ER 1405.
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repaying the customer's debt, legally the debt remains, and so receipt of the
payment constitutes neither a change of position nor good consideration.
The end result is a self-reinforcing logic whereby the result in Barclays Bank is
seen as consistent with, if not required by, the law's concern with ensuring that
the bank follows the customer's mandate. As a by-product, this emphasis upon
mandate reinforces the view that a bank is acting as a conduit. This, in turn,
supports an assumption of protection for banks against claims by others for
their payment errors.' The bank's liability, if any, is to its customer for failing
to honour their mandate. The problem is that this overlooks the complexity of
the bank-customer relationship.
Emphasising the payer's position
Having classified the bank's payment as coming within the restitutionary
category, the reasoning in Barclays Bank then assumes that payment should be
treated as any other mistaken payment should be. In short it regards the bank's
payment as an "imperfect transaction" which needs to be unwound.'35 But, by
focusing on the bank and giving insufficient regard to the payee, this result is
too "one-sided". 136 Hedley's concern, that broadening recovery for mistaken
payments results in "focu[sing] on the injustice of losing money by mistake,
while playing relatively little heed to the injustice that is caused by rectifying
that mistake", 137 is relevant here.
From the payee's perspective, the reasoning in Barclays Bank recognises only
two considerations which may displace their prima facie liability to restore the
payment. Both considerations are specific to individual transactions rather than
to stop-payments as a type of mistaken payment. The first is the potential
application of the change of position defence. This consideration applies within
the restitutionary regime. The second consideration is the customer's mandate.
If the customer has given their mandate to the payment the bank's claim moves
into the contractual regime. But having recognised the contractual regime,
Barclays Bank effectively precludes its application to stop-payments, leaving the
payee to rely on the change of position defence.
The reasoning in Barclays Bank proceeds on the assumption that the change of
position defence provides an adequate defence against any injustice. Generally
it does. But, as is illustrated by KJ Davies (1976) Ltd v Bank of New South Wales,'3g
this defence may be insufficient in the context of a stop-payment. There the payee
deposited a cheque into his business account unaware that payment had been
This is particularly important for Electronic Funds Transfers where there is greater
scope for error, ie late transfers, wrong account. In Wells v First National Commercial
Bank [1998] Professional Negligence and Liability Reports 552 the Court of Appeal
struck out a claim that a paying bank owed a duty of care to the recipient of a
funds transfer.
135 Kull, Restitution, above note 68, 1194.
136 Division and Ordering, above note 16, 27. Similar concerns underlie Andrew
Tettenborn's criticism of the causation test championed in Barclays Bank; see
Tettenborn, Restitution, above note 117, 76 (para 3-13).
137 Division and Ordering, above note 16, 27; Kull; Restitution, above note 68, 1234.
13 [1981] 1 NZLR 262 (HC).
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stopped. In good faith, the payee used the proceeds in the normal course of his
business. The Court rejected the payee's claim that this constituted a change of
position for the purposes of s 94B Judicature Act 1908 (a general statutory change
of position defence for mistaken payments). The payee was seen as merely
"bank[ing] the money to current account and us[ing] it in the ordinary course of
business" as if "the drawer ... had not stopped the cheque." 13 9
Indeed, the reasoning in Barclays Bank makes it highly unlikely that in ordinary
circumstances 140 the payee can ever successfully raise a change of position
defence. This follows from the assumption in Barclays Bank that the customer's
debt remains owing to the payee. Similar reasoning occurs in the Davies case.
There the Court observed that following the mistake, the payee had "the use of
the amount involved much earlier than it would have if it had to have recourse
to civil proceedings against its debtor"141 So, rather than the use of the money
constituting an adverse change of position it was a change "for the better."1 42
Even if a payee has spent the money on an extraordinary item having no residual
value, the reasoning in Barclays Bank suggests that the payee's liability to restore
the mistaken payment to the bank is, in a non-legal sense, offset as against the
customer's continuing liability to the payee.
But the problem is much more basic. The change of position defence provides
inadequate protection to the payee. The reasoning in Barclays Bank pays
insufficient regard to the legitimate interests of the payee for certainty of receipt.1 43
The payee does not regard their receipt of the payment as "temporary";44 to the
contrary they see it as the culmination of a legitimate payment process. For the
same reason, even if the customer subsequently becomes insolvent the payment
is not from the payee's perspective an "undeserved windfall"; 145 they did not
deliberately accept the risk of the bank's mistake. The point is that the reasoning
in Barclays Bank disregards certainty of receipt as an important consideration for
the law of restitution - recall its treatment of the rule in Cocks v Masterman.146
139 ibid, at 265. The result is particularly significant, for since Thomas v Houston Corbett
[1969] NZLR 151, (CA) it has been considered that s94B requires a balancing of
the equities between the mistaken payer and the recipient. It could be argued that
the bank took the risk.
140 A situation where the change of position defence may be more successful is where
the customer becomes insolvent shortly after the bank brings proceedings against
the payee to recover the mistaken payment. The payee may be able to argue that
if the payment had not been made it would have been able to recover the debt
from the then solvent customer. Cf Schall, above note 4, 119.
141 Davies [1981] 1 NZLR 262, 265.
142 ibid.
143 CfKleinworth Benson [199912 AC 349,359,395 (Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Lloyd
noting the importance of security of receipt and closure of transactions, and the
inability of the change of position defence to provide this); 382 (Lord Goff
recognising that new defences may be developed in the future to provide for
"stability of closed transactions").
144 Schall, above note 4, 119.
145 ibid. See also at 126.
146 Discussed in the text accompanying n112 - n113. Kull; Restitution, above note 68,
1234 (observing that by their very nature restitutionary claims are at odds with
the policy of certainty of transactions).
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Rather, certainty of receipt is seen as a consideration for the contractual regime
and operates through the "good consideration" defence.'47 Under the Barclays
Bank approach, a payee seeking certainty of payment would be advised to seek
express confirmation from the bank that they did not make a mistake so as to
lay the foundation for an estoppel defence. So much for an efficient payment
system!
E. Conclusion
Barclays Bank is a landmark case in the development of the law of restitution.
But it develops a restitutionary approach best suited to the typical Kelly v Solari-
type case of a mistaken payment where I pay you money mistakenly believing
that I owe you it, rather than the more complex stop-payment situation. In the
stop-payment situation different concerns are present (ie, agency considerations
and the commercial need for finality in the payment system) and these outweigh
those considerations which favour recovery in the two-party situation.
Unfortunately the reasoning in Barclays Bank disregards these wider
considerations.
This result arises because the reasoning in Barclays Bank is too restitutionary.
By classifying mistaken payments arising out of a stop-payment situation as
restitutionary and prescribing how restitutionary claims operate its reasoning
precludes subsequent courts from taking into account other considerations. In
so doing it produces a questionable result.
All recipients of cheques assume certain risks, ie forgery and insufficient funds
in the account. These are inherent in any credit-type transaction and the payee
can protect themselves against them. But it is harder to protect oneself against a
bank mistakenly overlooking a stop-payment instruction. Not spending the
money is not a real option. Nor is seeking confirmation that the payment is not
a mistake. The reasoning in Barclays Bank makes it almost impossible to protect
against this risk. By recognising the context in which this mistake occurs the
"reasonable expectation" approach remedies this.
Barclays Bank [1980] QB 677,695. Cf Unjust Enrichment, above note 3,139 (suggesting
that the good consideration defence is not directed to certainty of receipt per se
but a policy of upholding bargains); CEF Rickett and R Grantham, Enrichment and
Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, London, 2000), 143.
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